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Direct and Indirect Crisis Effects on International
Trade or: Is There a Chance to Employ an Income
Stimulus to Stimulate Exports?
Alexander Konon*
While research concerning the fundamental connection between Vnancial crises
and international trade, at Vrst appearance, provides conclusive results, it displays
two speciVc methodological biases by ignoring income eUects: Vrst, crisis inWuence
is underestimated; second, crisis dynamics do not take account of income dynamics,
thereby giving the analysis a touch of avoidable incompleteness. This paper oUers a
solution to both problems without leaving the standard framework of the gravity
model of trade. The solution is brought by a basic crisis adjustment technique of
income. As an empirical test, the developed approach is employed to estimate the
crisis response of German trade during the recent global crisis. Results correspond
to consequences deducted from an elementary impact model for a quasi-non-crisis
country: exports are mainly aUected by non-income eUects and foreign income
eUects; imports are inWuenced by domestic income and global non-income eUects,
and reveal expected dynamics. The outcome has two implications of interest for
policy decisions: (i) stimulus spillovers can come back, and (ii) the indirect eUect
sensitivity of imports delivers a strong case for an international coordination of Vscal
measures.
1 introduction
Research on the connection between Vnancial crises and international trade, nowadays, takes two
directions. First, there is a question about a contagious eUect—a crisis in one country causes a
crisis in a second country—contingent on highly developed trade linkages and changes in relative
prices. Corresponding results are ambivalent, viz.: on the grounds that trade and Vnance links
are highly correlated, separating trade eUects from Vnance eUects is a complex undertaking.1
Second, there is an issue about crisis inWuence on trade. At Vrst glance, results in this research
sector look obvious. At second glance, one can perceive a speciVc (methodological) bias.
To clarify this point: Abiad et al. (2011) investigate trade dynamics in economies experiencing
a Vnancial crisis (179 crisis episodes) in the period 1970–2009. The main Vndings are a negative
long-term eUect on real imports and no signiVcant eUects on real exports. Another reference
study is Ma and Cheng (2005), who analyze banking and currency crises from 1981 until 1998. The
results are akin to Abiad et al. (2011): banking crises lead up to a short-term reduction in imports
and a rise in exports; and a currency crisis gives rise to a short-term reduction in imports and
exports. These conclusions seem contra-intuitive or not-so-consistent for three reasons.
(i) Both studies employ a closed trade system. Imports and exports are complementary variables,
e. g. a fall in imports in one country has to be accommodated by a fall in exports in another
country. If reduced imports are induced by a Vnancial crisis, so are reduced exports. In the Vrst
* University of Potsdam, Institute of Mathematics, Germany. E-Mail: konon@uni-potsdam.de.
1 See Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) or—for an overview about methodology and results—Forbes (2002). In case of
Forbes (2002), half of the six referenced studies (Eichengreen and Rose 1996; Glick and Rose 1999; Forbes 2000; Masson
1998; Baig and Goldfajn 1998; Harrigan 2000) speak against the signiVcance of the contagious eUect and the other
half Vnds evidence for its relevance. Forbes’ (2002) own conclusion is that crisis induced changes in international
competitiveness and income eUects can eventuate in crisis transfers.
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place, exports in the crisis country might not be touched by the crisis but in general exports
decline. Declining exports reduce income or: a trade eUect is a ceteris-paribus income eUect.
Consequently, in the second place, exports in the crisis country should decline as well. So, why do
exports stay constant or rise? (ii) In both estimations the authors control for income. This leads
to the question: which type of eUect is quantiVed? While Ma and Cheng (2005) do not explicitly
answer this question, Abiad et al. (2011) regard the eUect as abnormal trade behavior after crisis
excluding output dynamics. However, altered output dynamics are an essential consequence
of Vnancial crises. Thus, the analysis is not complete. (iii) Apparently, there is an aggregation
problem. Given results may hold for single crisis episodes in a particular country—which is
debatable—but not for a global crisis. Even though in Abiad et al. (2011) the global crisis 2008–
2009 is part of the data, study results contradict the actual crisis outcome, given in Figure 1.
Worldwide, economies reacted with a reduction in exports by approximately 13% (USA and UK)
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Figure 1: Development of exports and imports during the international Vnancial crisis
to 32% (Japan) and a decrease in imports by 13% (France and Germany) to 35% (Russia), thereby
displaying consistent properties regarding imports and exports.
The main argumentative line of this paper is that described inconsistencies and diXculties of
interpretation occur due to examining only one type of crisis eUects. Accordingly, a solution is
brought by adding a second type of eUects to the investigation: indirect or income eUects. The
following questions summarize the main focus: What kind of eUects do matter? Is there empirical
evidence for the dominance of one kind of eUects over the other. Are imports and exports aUected
diUerently?
Against the background of rising exports and stagnating imports in Vnancial crises, there is a
policy (better: no-need-for-policy) story. This policy story is premised on an automatic counter-
crisis mechanism and goes like this: a country with a Vnancial crisis devaluates making exports
more competitive and imports more expensive. On a short-term basis, there is no fundamental
need for Vscal policy to gain (regain) international competitiveness; the exchange rate adjustment
is a “natural” counter-crisis measure. Au naturel, every rule has an exception—in this case, there
are at least two of them. First and trivially, in a currency union exchange rate adjustments are
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not possible. Ordinarily, a Vxed exchange rate requires to simulate a devaluation (often called
an internal devaluation) by reducing nominal wages and prices. If wages are sticky, then this
involves higher rates of unemployment—frequently accompanied by social frictions rooted in
rejections of wage cuts by workers. Second, even if a country has its own currency a devaluation
does not necessarily improve competitiveness in a global crisis. A trade rival may devalue more
quickly because of a more severe crisis. If the trade partner is hit by the same crisis shock, then
an adjustment might not take place at all. (All of this belongs to the aggregation problem.)
In settings with constrained currency instruments Vscal policy could take on a supportive role.
Still, some preconditions must be fulVlled. First of all, Vscal measures have to alter aggregated
income. Post hoc, the intrinsic income shock must be spread across countries. As Cooper and
Kempf (2009) have shown, Vscal spillovers are unavoidable in a monetary union. Beetsma et al.
(2005) established statistically signiVcant spillover eUects in Europe. (The transmission channel
is trade.) As a second condition, there must be a cross-boarder feedback eUect. What is meant by
feedback is the last element of the following sequence: country 1 stimulates its income; income
stimulation of 1 leads to a higher import demand of country 1 directed at country 2; country 2
expands exports to country 1; income in country 2 rises (a Vscal spillover); and import demand of
country 2 directed at country 1 rises (stimulus feedback).
The feedback eUect works independent from any currency mechanism, besides, it depends on
income eUects. Namely: by examining the relevance of income eUects on trade, the importance
of the stimulus feedback can be evaluated. A feedback stimulus of exports and improvements
in competitiveness do not have the same basal properties. For instance, competitiveness gains
reduce trade deVcits; feedback eUects are neutral on trade deVcits. Howbeit, they have one
overlapping property: both stabilize the economic situation—a high priority task in a crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 takes a theoretical look at eUect types; direct
and indirect eUects are inducted. With the aid of a minimalist two-country-two-year model the
conjunction of direct and indirect crisis eUects is untangled. Furthermore, the model allows to
designate some principal determinants. Beyond, several direct and indirect eUects are identiVed
with the help of available literature. Section 3 carries the distinction, from Section 2, forward into
the gravity model of trade. Subsequently, in Section 4, devised analytical procedures are applied
utilizing the example of Germany and the contemporary global crisis. Section 5 concludes.
This paper provides two contributions to research. One contribution is an implementation of
indirect eUects on trade without altering the gravity model. The other contribution is a dissection
of crisis eUects on German trade from diverging prospects.
2 direct and indirect crisis effects in a theoretical perspective
An elementary description of indirect eUects is that these kind of eUects are straight related to
income. Estimations that control for income abstract from every Vrst-hand income eUect. As
opposed to this, direct eUects are not directly income related and covered by income controlled
estimations. The diUerence between these two types of eUects is a good starting point to explicate
occurring inconsistencies.
To explain the Abiad et al. (2011) scenario, reduced imports and constant exports, suppose there
are only two countries: country 1 and country 2, which constitutes the rest of the world. Country
1 imports goods and services from 2. Mirror-inverted, country 2 exports goods and services to 1 et
vice versa. Let real imports, respectively real exports, be a linear function of real income with an
upward slope as depicted in Figure 2. Every point on the linear function represents an indirect
eUect and every point elsewhere a combination of direct and indirect eUects. Whilst direct eUects
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Figure 2: Direct and indirect eUects in a minimalist two-period-two-country model
are assumed to be exogenous, indirect eUects in 1 are determined by the marginal propensity
to import, which is equivalent to the slope of the curve. Indirect eUects in 2 are regulated by
the inverse of the marginal propensity to export, which is equivalent to the slope of the inverse
function. Start from the premise that propensities are identical in both countries. This is an
implication of the Vgure’s construction but not a necessary postulate. Pre-crisis situation, in the
Vrst period, is depicted by point A. Country 1 experiences a Vnancial crisis with direct eUects only.
New imports are represented by point B. Income in 1 does not change. This is the basic scenario
ignoring indirect eUects. What happens in the second country is that owing to a negative demand
shock exports decrease to point A′. Simultaneously, production adjusts to a reduced demand
level, meaning that income is reduced too. Export level moves from A to A′′. In total, country 1
moves from A to B, country 2 from A to A′′. A direct eUect in 1 provokes an indirect eUect in 2.
From the standpoint of a direct-eUect-only approach, imports decrease and exports do not shift at
all.
In the second period, second row of Figure 2, an analogous pattern continues. Because the
demand shock in 1 reduces production in 2, income in 2 and hence import demand is weakened.
Imports in 2 move from A to A′′. The export sector in 1 adapts and reduces production from D
to D′. Ergo, in the second period, there are indirect eUects only. The overall direct eUect is a
decrease in imports in the Vrst country; exports are not varied by means of direct eUects in the
Vrst country; and there are no direct eUects in the second country. This is exactly the Abiad et al.
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(2011) scenario but the actual crisis upshot is a reduction in imports and exports. A byproduct of
the argument is that the aggregation problem disappears because crisis eUects on exports and
imports act in the same direction. Global crises would induce eUects in both countries modifying
the strength of reaction but not changing the reaction altogether.
But, the rationality behind the proposition may not be valid in at least three cases. (i) The
examined trade system is not self-contained. While this problem is unavoidable in empirical
investigations, measurement errors should not carry as much weight if the number of countries
taken into consideration is high. (ii) The structure of trade is altered. For example, if the country
experiencing a foreign demand shock Vnds new markets for selling its goods and services,
then, perhaps, it will keep its original export niveau. Although, this is rather a Leibnizian
best of the possible worlds outcome and not general rule. (iii) Income losses are compensated
by debt Vnanced government measures. Remember that income reduction in country 2 bears
responsibility for export reduction in country 1. Now, imagine that income losses in 2 are fully
compensated by a government stimulus: in the second row of Figure 2, the crisis shock moves
economy of 2 from A to A′′ and government activity back from A′′ to A. In that case, import
demand in 2 is not lowered and the second region’s exports are unchanged. This rule applies
primarily to government actions with the goal of income stabilization. Special non-discriminating
government subsidies, which, under the assumption that recipients are suXciently numerous,
can be portrayed as positive supply shocks, should manifest as positive direct eUects. (Especially,
since subsidies linked to speciVc actions cannot be saved.)
Collectively, there are three conceivable model scenarios: (1) indirect eUects on a country
with a domestic Vnancial crisis, (2) indirect eUects on a country without a domestic crisis but
involved in trade with countries suUering from Vnancial crises and (3) indirect crisis eUects on
a global scale. Functional chains are as described above. Table 1 gives an overview on main
Table 1: Main determinants of indirect eUects
Scenario Characterization of eUect Determinants∗
(1) Domestic crisis 1. Indirect eUect on imports Home propensity to import
2. Indirect eUect on exports (i) Inverse of foreign propensity to ex-
port, (ii) foreign propensity to import,
(iii) inverse of home propensity to ex-
port
(2) Foreign crisis 1. Indirect eUect on exports Inverse of home propensity to export
2. Indirect eUect on imports Home propensity to import
(3) Global crisis 1. Indirect eUects on imports Home and foreign propensities to im-
port
2. Indirect eUects on exports Inverse of home and foreign propensity
to export
∗ Higher value leads to a stronger indirect eUect.
determinants. Note that a reaction to a domestic or global crisis initiates with altered imports,
whereas a non-crisis country starts with an export reaction. As well, short-term income reduction
in a non-crisis country is fully explained by export decreases and domestic propensity to export.
Income decreases in crisis countries have an additional domestic component—income reduction
does not equal export reduction divided by the marginal domestic propensity to export. From
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a purely theoretical standpoint, it is diXcult to infer which eUect type will dominate, but the
probability of indirect eUect domination rises with its rising determinant values.
So far, rather broad deVnitions were made use of. Some more precise eUect explanations can be
given if currency and debt crises are diUerentiated from banking crises. As Forbes (2002) stated,
currency devaluations invoked by a currency crisis or by poor debt politics work through two
direct channels. First, the exporting crisis country obtains a competitive advantage because its
exports become relatively cheaper. Second, and this is the other side of the coin, the importing
non-crisis country receives a positive import shock as it proVts from lower prices. Indirect
devaluation eUects arise because income and import demand are diminished.
The listed emanations may appear slightly simplifying. A more sophisticated distinction is
delivered by Ma and Cheng (2005). The addressed authors derive the most plausible repercussions
from a bank run in a principal-agent model with domestic and foreign agents. Both types of
agents terminate their accounts before the Vnanced project is completed. Because aggregated
panic sale value is lower than aggregated account value, some agents do not get their money
back. Basically, this leads to two direct eUect oUsprings. For one thing, foreign agents reduce
their long-ranging investment activity. By implications, exports fall. For other thing, overall
investment demand falls leading to reduced imports of foreign input goods. Contemporaneously,
foreign capital expenditure is reduced and more domestic goods must be exported in exchange
for the same amount of foreign investment goods. Indirect eUects emerge because bank default
causes domestic and foreign demand to drop, and imports and exports drop too.
The central aspect of currency crises, as presented by Ma and Cheng (2005), is a high exchange
rate volatility causing agents to avoid overseas business activity. Direct eUects include a domestic
substitution of foreign goods, lowering imports and exports, and domestic agents’ welfare losses
due devaluation that are oUset by partial non-consumption, lowering imports but increasing the
potential to export. EUects indirectly involving imports and exports are straight-forward: to
avoid risk, foreign agents cut their import demand, domestic income decreases cutting domestic
imports.
All crisis channels forecast sinking imports while exports, at least in the short run, can rise.
Up to now, all indirect eUects were income eUects induced by a crisis. Qua deVnition this type
of income eUects is negative. As described above, indirect eUects are not necessarily restricted
to negative eUects. Usually, a crisis sparks oU government reactions to compensate for output
losses or to overcome the crisis. Albeit, Vscal policy is not obligatorily expansive and negative
Vscal multipliers are not something unheard of (see Spilimbergo et al. 2009), its impact can be
positive. In an aggregate, indirect eUects are comprised of negative crisis eUects and eUective
policy actions.
The standard approach to estimate trade relations—also instrumentalized by Ma and Cheng
(2005), and Abiad et al. (2011)—is the gravity model of trade. In the gravity model’s framework, it
is diXcult to generate suitable tests for every channel. I suggest to test for four eUect clusters:
currency eUects, direct non-currency eUects, indirect eUects excluding government measures,
and government action eUects.
3 direct and indirect crisis effects in a gravity equation framework
Assume that trade Wows (sum of imports and exports) can be Vtted by a gravity model of trade,
which is well tested (see Bun and Klaassen 2002; Cheng and Wall 2005) and can be derived from
a basic Heckscher-Ohlin model (see DeardorU 1995) or, like Egger (2000) trenchantly stated, from
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every plausible trade model. The corresponding equation for a trade Wow between country i and
j at the time t in log-linear form is
log(Fijt) = C+ Cij + α1 log(yit) + α2 log(yjt) + β′1xijt + β
′
2zij + γ
′cijt + eijt. (1)
C is a constant. Cij is a deterministic or stochastic country-speciVc eUect. Real income of i is
yit and of j yij. Vector xijt covers time variant control variables like time itself or the log of
exchange rates. zij contains time invariant eUects like log of distance, constituting transport
costs, preference divergence or diUerent cultural characteristics (see Feyrer 2009), or dummies
for common boarder, membership in the same political or economic entity and so on. eijt is an
unspeciVed error term.
cijt is a crisis vector with crisis indicator variables. Suppose, for reasons of simplicity, that the
crisis vectors consists of non lagged and lagged dummies (1 if there was a crisis and else 0) for a
Vnancial crisis in i cit, a crisis in j cij and a twin crisis in i and j cijt. CoeXcient vector γ deVnes
the particular economies’ crisis response. Response function of i to a domestic crisis stroke is
RiT =
T
∑
s=0
γis (2)
with T as periods after crisis start. Estimating equation (1) solely calculates direct eUects. Let us
denote the corresponding response function RDiT .
To compute income losses, it is required to make a counterfactual statement about how income
would have developed if there was no crisis. Suppose that income would follow its estimated
long-ranging trend τit. Then a crisis loss at the time t in percent of trend income is
yLossit =
τit − yit
τit
. (3)
Trend income can, for example, be calculated in line with Hodrick and Prescott (1981) by solving
the following minimization problem:
min
{τit}
=
{
T
∑
t=1
(yit − τit)2 + λ
T
∑
t=2
[(τi[t+1] − τit)− (τit − τi[t−1])]2
}
. (4)
Smoothing factor λ has to be set accordingly to data frequency. Conventionally, for quarterly
data the factor is λ = 1, 600. Succeedingly, actual income can be adjusted, eliminating crisis
losses and handing out crisis adjusted income y∗it, by
y∗it =
{
yit − cit(yit − τit) if yit > τit
yit else
. (5)
Plugging adjusted income from equation (5) into equation (1) gives the full crisis response RFiT in
i.
Let DiT ≡ RFiT − RDiT be a decomposition function. DiT is built up of at least three components.
At the outset, there is a cyclical component because the adjustment procedure liquidates cycle
from income such that it is caught by the response function. Second oU, there are income eUects
that are negative. Thirdly, government actions can crystallize as positive eUects on income.
Altogether, the decomposition function captures indirect eUects and non-crisis cycle. An inquiry
of direct and indirect eUects can proceed as follows: the Vrst step is to estimate crisis response
with non-adjusted income. The second step is to estimate the response function with adjusted
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income, and as a side-oU product calculate gross crisis eUects. The last step is to compare both
estimated functions, i. e. the computation of the extent of indirect eUects.
It is feasible to roughly predict the direction of action for most of the eUect clusters. This
is performed in Table 2. Naturally, government activity is not inevitably trade stimulating. A
Table 2: Direction of action from the standpoint of a country with an inherent crisis
EUect cluster Theoretical direction
for imports
Theoretical direction
for exports
Currency eUects − ±
Non-currency direct eUects − if no speciVc supply
stimulus from govern-
ment
± if speciVc supply
stimulus
±
Indirect eUects without government action − −
Broad government action eUects + +
prerequisite is, however, that eUects are measurable and, in the speciVed frame of reference,
negative government eUects are indiscernible from income eUects. Strictly speaking, in the event
of exports, income eUects equal positive and negative shocks in the production sphere. Negative
production shocks are a reWection of demand shocks. Positive shocks on production are successful
government measures to rise the competitiveness of domestic Vrms. Hence, there is no urgent
need to come up with a speciVc realm of production eUects.
Currency eUects can be calculated by estimating one model with the exchange rate variable
and one without, and making a comparison between estimated crisis response functions. Income
eUects usually take some time to reveal themselves. There is a chance that the application of the
adjustment procedure causes a time shift, so that aggregate eUects may take place with a stronger
delay than direct eUects.
4 the case of germany and the crisis
The purpose to examine only one country and one crisis period is motivated twofold. An
asymmetric system allows to concentrate on a restricted set of determinants: domestic and
foreign propensities. Germany as a special case permits to narrow down relevant criteria even
further because there is simulation evidence that the crisis irruption was mainly not caused by
a domestic banking crisis (see Quaas and Klein 2011). In the wake of this, Germany might be
treated as a quasi-non-crisis country. A second motivational complex is that Germany did not
experience a debt crisis in the aftermath of the global crisis as, for example, Greece. Debt crises
provoked by state reactions to banking crises embody a somehow “twisted” causality in the scope
of the gravity model of trade. At this juncture, measures to control one Vnancial crisis are the
cause of the eruption of an another crisis. Trade would be aUected by a cumulative eUect without
the possibility to distinguish between root causes.
An another exemplar of obscure causality is crisis contagion. Direct and indirect eUects could
take two routes: a crisis causes transformations of trade or trade transformations trigger a
crisis. Crisis contagion through trade renders a stringent causality interpretation impossible. Yet,
according to Berkmen et al. (2010) shocks are transmitted through Vnance channels in developed
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economies and through trade channels, mainly because of absence of Vnance links, in developing
economies. Trade Vnance would aUect both types of economies but appears extraneous in case
of the recent crisis (see Asmundson et al. 2011). On these grounds, it is safe to presuppose no
contagion.
As for government activity, Germany implemented two stimulus packages: Konjunkturpaket I
and Konjunkturpaket II.2 The Vrst package was passed in November 2008. It was mainly designed
as a measure to secure employment. The second package was passed in January 2009. A widely
popular element of the second package was an environmental bonus of 2,500 Euros for scrapping
older vehicles (the so-called Umweltprämie) starting in January 2009 and ending in June 2010. So,
there exist two candidates for government eUects. Inherently, the Umweltprämie is a positive
supply shock on the automobile market and, therefore, should exhibit direct eUects’ qualities.
Both packages were implemented with the goal of income stabilization and qualify as broad
government activity, and should have indirect eUects’ features.
Figure 3 showcases changes in government spending and taxation during the crisis period forTabelle1
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Figure 3: Spending and taxes of selected OECD countries in crisis times
selected OECD countries, which are all part of the sample made use of in the next subsections.
Compared to European countries, German stimulus packages were of relatively extended scope.
The two economically largest non-European countries inducted a surpassing stimulus. Potentially,
there are two likely sources for positive income eUects: German and foreign government stimulus.
This should be taken into account in the formulation of models.
2 A description of packages and its elements can be found on the website of the German Federal Ministry for Finance
www.bundesVnanzministerium.de.
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4.1 Description of basic model and estimation method
The export equation to be estimated is
log(Xit) = C+ Ci + α1 log(yit) + α2 log(yt) + β′1xit + β
′
2zi +
K
∑
k=0
γkct−k + eit. (6)
Imports are estimated analogously but with the assumption that exports and imports can react
diUerently, respectively that exports and imports can have diUering coeXcients. Variables are:
yit is income of trade partner i. yt is German income. xit consists of time t, a dummy for EU
membership euit (1 if EU member and else 0) and the log of exchange rate log(exit) of country i
based on the Euro. Vector zi covers the log of distance log(Di) from Berlin to the capital city of i
and a dummy for common boarder with Germany ggdi (1 if there is a common boarder and else
0). Data frequency is quarters. The global crisis dummy ct is set to 1 for the Vrst quarter 2008
until third quarter 2009, and else is 0.
Ci is a country-speciVc eUect. There are three options to model Ci. Normally, diUerences
between countries can be ascribed to historical, political or geographical developments (see
Egger 2000) and are of deterministic nature. Modeling Ci as a deterministic eUect—the most
intuitive approach—is in accordance with a Vxed eUects (FE) estimator. A random eUects (RE)
estimator treats Ci as a stochastic factor. With basic FE estimators it is not possible to estimate
β2 because zi is perfectly correlated with Ci but non-perfect correlation between Ci and other
exogenous variables is allowed. (There are enhanced methods like Hausman and Taylor (1981) to
estimate time-invariant eUects with Vxed country eUects.) RE estimators do not allow error term
correlation with Ci but coeXcients of time-invariant variables can be estimated. In addition, RE
estimators permit generalization, whereas FE estimators are bound to the sample. Finally, one
could simply ignore Ci and employ an pooled regression (POLS).
At this point a rather pragmatic strategy was chosen. First, every model is estimated with
FE, RE and POLS. Then, the best estimator is selected in accordance with two speciVcation tests
portrayed in Table 3, which as well deliver hints of consistency. However, POLS is abandoned
Table 3: Criteria for model selection
Test Null hypothesis Conclusion if null hypothesis is rejected
F-Test All country speciVc constants are iden-
tical.
RE or FE model is adequate.
Hausman test RE estimator is consistent. FE model is adequate.
Note: All tests are valid at the 5% level.
after the Vrst estimations because every test and even common sense suggests that there are
country-speciVc eUects.
Appropriated models and corresponding model descriptions are depicted in Table 4. Estimated
crisis response functions are calculated in the manner of equation (2) with T = 0, . . . ,K and
K = 8. Equation (5) strictly takes account of losses but I am more interested in across-the-board
output dynamics. On that score, income is adjusted in consonance with the following equation:
y∗it = yit − cit(yit − τit). (5’)
The construction of the BC17 group is described in the next section. First models 1a and 1b are
similar to conventional crisis estimation techniques. Model 2 helps to calculate the German
10
Table 4: Descriptions of estimation models
Main assumptions Equivalent adjustment process and speciVc con-
trol variables
Model 1a All countries were hit by direct eUects only
excluding exchange rate eUects.
No adjustment, controlling for exchange rates
Model 1b Every country was aUected by direct eUects
including currency eUects but not by indirect
eUects.
No adjustment, no controlling for exchange
rates
Model 2 During the crisis, Germany experienced direct
and indirect eUects. Trade partners were spared
from indirect eUects but not from direct eUects.
Crisis adjustment of German income, no con-
trolling for exchange rates
Model 3 Germany and the BC17 were aUected by direct
and indirect eUects but the rest not by indirect
eUects.
Crisis adjustment of German income and BC17
income, no controlling for exchange rates
Model 4 All countries were pertained by income and
direct eUects, although not necessarily in con-
sequence of a domestic crisis.
Crisis adjustment of all incomes, no controlling
for exchange rates
indirect eUect. Model 3 aids in the estimation of overall indirect eUects. Model 4 serves for
comparison purposes. Conceptually, in model 4, income decrease is eliminated from the chain
of causation by the adjustment procedure for every country. In theory, this should isolate all
income eUects giving an estimation of the entire impact of income sacriVce on trade; producing
in the process the highest response estimation result regarding its absolute value. All models
are estimated in two versions: an unrestricted estimation with all crisis coeXcients and a
restricted estimation with crisis coeXcients signiVcant at the 5% level only. Non-signiVcant crisis
coeXcients are successively eliminated starting with the highest lag.
4.2 Data
Evaluation period is 43 quarters from the Vrst quarter 2000 until the third quarter 2010. The data
panel was constructed using the following sources: import and export time series are taken from
the Federal Statistical OXce of Germany. Monthly data was aggregated to quarterly data. In the
process, 31 countries were selected for a sample. A list of chosen countries with import and export
ratios relatively to German overall imports and exports is given in Table 6. Most of the countries
are European and members of the European Union with the Euro as currency or currencies linked
to the Euro (for example, former Estonian currency board). For the Vrst quarter 2010, the sample
corresponds to approximately 70% of the German trade volume and captures most of German
international interchange of goods. Figure 4 shows the aggregated sample. Exports appear to be
permanently reduced and imports nearly fully recovered in the last quarter of 2010. There is a
persistent trade surplus. Fluctuations are lightly more common in imports than in exports. In
Figure 5, countries with a Vxed exchange rate to the Euro and countries with variable exchange
rates are grouped together. Import curves display aligned movement and export curves more
divergent motions, a predictor of higher exchange rate sensitivity of exports. Added together,
1,333 data points are available.
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Figure 4: Exports and imports in the sample (2000Q1–2010Q3)
According to Laeven and Valencia (2010) 17 of the 31 examined German trade partners experi-
enced a banking crisis starting 2007 or 2008. These countries are subsumed under the label “BC17
group”. Seasonally adjusted real GDP data and exchange rate values were taken from Eurostat.
Distances were calculated with the help of Google Maps and entry times into the European Union
were acquired from europa.eu.
Table 7 gives a summary on basic statistics. Table 8 contains a correlation matrix. There is
no observable pairwise collinearity. Income losses of trade partners are depicted in Figure 6.
Interestingly enough, all of the countries show a typical bubble pattern: exceptional expansion
and a sudden contraction. Worth mentioning is that in the Vrst three and in some cases all
quarters of 2008 income was systematically higher than trend GDP. Put another way, from the
income’s point of view the Vnancial bubble bursted in the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009
and not immediately. Germany evinces the same pattern but with moderate losses around 2% in
the Vrst quarter 2009—the drop height was 4.5% over trend GDP in the beginning of 2008—and a
steady recovery reaching trend GDP in the last quarter of 2009.3 In sum, German losses were not
extraordinary; the speed of recovery was indeed remarkable.
4.3 Main determinants
As pointed out in the second section, eUect type proportion is governed by marginal propensities
to export and import. These are the analytical model’s main determinants. If Germany was of the
type of internal crisis country, then exports were inWuenced by a chain reaction depending on
propensities to export and import in the rest of the world. Notwithstanding, as countries typically
do not rely on only one trade partner, the particular chain eUect may not be that important.
Germany as external crisis country would simplify necessary inquiry because then short-run
reaction would depend exclusively on domestic propensities. In all, there are two issues. The Vrst
3 The calculated losses are rather conservative because smoothed income is based on crisis GDP.
12
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
110000
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Time
Fixed exchange rate
Variable exchange rate
Development of exports (in million of Euros)
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany and own calculations
(a) Exports (2000Q1–2010Q3)
45000
50000
55000
60000
65000
70000
75000
80000
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Time
Fixed  exchange rate
Variable exchange rate
Development of imports (in million of Euros)
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany and own calculations
(b) Imports (2000Q1–2010Q3)
Figure 5: Exports and imports grouped according to exchange rate relevance
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Figure 6: Estimated income losses (negative values = loss)
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question is: was German income aUected by a domestic banking crisis or was income diminution
mainly an impact of foreign banking, currency or debt crises? The second question is about the
plausibility of dominance of one type of eUects in respect of imports and exports.
To estimate propensities one could calculate mean trade-to-GDP ratios. An other possibility is
to use an estimate of the following equation system, avoiding crisis distortions and selection bias
by utilization of pre-crisis data and controlling for panel heterogeneity, exchange rates evolution,
time, and membership in the European Union:
Xit = C1 + C1i +mpxIndivyt + λ11t+ λ12∆exit + λ13euit + e1it, (7)
Iit = C2 + C2i +mpiIndivyt + λ21t+ λ22∆exit + λ23euit + e2it. (8)
Here, coeXcients of income represent an average individual response to a change in trade relation
with one country, which can be aggregated to total propensity by multiplication with the number
of considered countries—if the assumption that all individual reactions are identical is made.
Anticipate that estimated individual German propensities are higher than actual individual
propensities because the sample accounts for just a fraction of German trade. Estimation results
are given in Table 9. As a robustness test, foreign propensities to export to Germany and import
from Germany are also estimated by replacing German income with trade partner income and
interchanging imports and exports. CoeXcients resulting from this are encapsulated in Table 9.
RE estimators are consistent in case of German propensities and, such being the case, results can
be generalized. Alternative estimates for Germany are summarized in the second column of Table
5.4 The third column depicts foreign propensities that turn out as small as expected. German
ratios were calculated with total volume data.
Table 5: Estimations of pre-crisis (2000–2007) propensities
Estimates for Germany Estimates for trade partners
Mean exports-to-GDP ratio 0.347 0.072
Mean imports-to-GDP ratio 0.284 0.089
Individual propensity to export 0.019 0.001
Individual propensity to import 0.021 0.002
Aggregated propensity to export 0.589 Not applicable
Aggregated propensity to import 0.651 Not applicable
With this information, it is possible to estimate the expected, export associated, short-time
income eUect
ˆ∆yt
Induced by exports ≡ 1
ˆmpx
∆Xt. (9)
Figure 7 shows two discrete estimates. By all appearances, losses are lower than expected, and if
so, there is some plausibility behind the statement that, in real terms, Germany was a country
without a domestic banking crisis. At least, income reduction can be explained as an outgrowth
4 Marginal propensities from equations (7) and (8), which represent a behavioral relation, Vt the minimalist eUect model
better than propensities based on ratios, which are a technical relation. The propensity to import is not only driven by
the consumption motive but, additionally, by a demand for intermediate and capital goods (see Stirböck 2006).
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Figure 7: Estimated income eUects resulting from a reduction in exports
of export decline without the need for further arguments. Adventitiously, there must have been
an eUective income stimulus preventing a sharp income decrease.
It is possible to estimate import decreases in the same fashion. Part of import reduction can be
traced back to income reduction. Formally, income eUects correspond to
∆ˆI
Induced by income
t ≡ ˆmpi∆yt. (10)
In Figure 8, two diUerent estimates are mapped. Principally, this Vgure oUers two important
insights. Nearly half of the import decrease can be interpreted as an income eUect, and there
were positive and negative direct and indirect eUects. Noteworthy is that an instant positive
direct eUect can be unequivocally recognized after crisis outbreak.
At this stage, gathering all given information makes it accomplishable to sketch the most
plausible crisis scenario and deduce consequences on German trade. (The reaction chain presented
is rather logical than temporal but temporal facets are mentioned.) Since Germany can be seen as
a country hit by an exogenous crisis shock, there are only two crisis increments. To begin with,
Germany’s trade partners reduce their import demand. Demand reduction consists of direct and
indirect eUects. Because foreign propensities are rather small, it is reasonable to assume that
demand reduction is, in the main, made up of direct eUects. Next, German companies reduce
production—this is the concurrent income eUect. Due to the fact that German propensity to
export is high, the share of German indirect eUects in overall eUects should also be rather small.
En masse, there should be an immediate export reduction largely composed of direct eUects.
Thereafter, income losses are transferred into the import sector but this sector is hit by direct
eUects too. The impact of indirect eUects needs some time to entrench itself. Imagined on a time
axis, the reaction should start with direct eUects. After that, there should be a negative indirect
eUect. The next statement depends upon the eUectiveness of government action. If government
activity was eUective, then there should be evidence for a positive indirect and maybe, arising
from the Umweltprämie, a positive direct eUect. First and last, indirect eUects should have a large
proportion because the propensity to import is high.
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Figure 8: Estimated import reduction
Despite that the outlined scenario reminds of a thought experiment, it can be empirically tested.
Accessorily, notice that the principles I employed were just conditional relations from the basic
model complemented by estimates of determinants. A petitio prencipii is unlikely.
4.4 Estimating direct and indirect eUects
Unrestricted estimations of the crisis response of exports are presented in the Tables 10 and
11. Tables 12 and 13 show unrestricted estimations of response functions of imports. Sample
selection emerges to be more substantial in case of exports, which are best comprehended by a FE
model. An explanation for this phenomenon could be German’s export sector specialization in,
rather price inelastic, research intensive products (see Belitz et al. 2009). This could manifest as a
parallel foreign demand structure. German imports, apart from that, are not concentrated around
a speciVc category of goods. In this way, country-speciVc import eUects are ruled by chance and
are best Vtted by a RE model.
All coeXcients of determination are high. So, gravity model and data harmonize well. Presum-
ably because the country selection consists mostly of European countries, exchange rate eUects
are almost irrelevant. Merely, export responses at crisis start and the beginning of 2009 display
some changes as a result of the elimination of the exchange rate variable. In case of exports,
inWuence of German and foreign GDP is balanced. The gravity of German GDP on imports
outmatches foreign GDP. Unquestionably, the fact itself is not surprising but the extent is striking.
In unrestricted estimations not all crisis coeXcients are signiVcant and for that reason hard to
interpret. Restricted estimations, with only signiVcant crisis coeXcients, are depicted in Table 14.
Crisis responses, based on Table 14a and Table 14b, are drawn in Figure 9.
Exports were mostly stroked by direct eUects. German income eUects were barely relevant.
Direct and indirect eUects took place at the same time. Both eUects were active immediately.
There is slight evidence for positive indirect eUects in the course of crisis onset. Income was
systematically higher than trend in this period reWecting a Vnancial bubble and not government
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stimulus. And there was a positive exchange rate eUect at the beginning of 2009 but it was
negligibly small. Individual eUects are negative and so is the cumulative eUect.
Imports display a positive direct eUect right after crisis beginning—there is a counterpart
for this eUect in Figure 8—but this occurrence can be reduced to a Maltese anomaly. Malta’s
(country number 16) exports to Germany rose inordinately in the third and fourth quarter of
2008. I removed Malta from the sample and estimated crisis responses with a sample of 30
countries. Results are in Table 15. The positive eUect becomes non-signiVcant. Admittedly,
the beneVcial eUect of being Malta two periods after crisis start is interesting in itself but it is
not inevitably pertinent to the analysis at hand. Without Malta, direct eUects were exclusively
negative, providing no evidence for impact of the Umweltprämie.
Again, there was a positive income overheating eUect after crisis beginning. Crisis dynamics
are eminently modiVed by the introduction of income eUects. Income eUects occur later than
direct eUects and there is evidence for a successful government stimulus commencing operations
in the late-middle of 2009. German income eUect was the strongest indirect eUect—responsible
for about a half of import reduction. In the aggregate, imports were dominated by indirect eUects.
Cumulative eUects are negative.
An important conclusion is that direct eUects underestimate the overall crisis eUect. Overall
eUects are systematically higher than eUects that result from a method enclosing nothing but
direct eUects. As anticipated, model 4 (addition of direct eUects and the “world income eUect”)
yields the largest crisis responses. Exports were especially hard-hit. What is more, the derived
scenario cannot be rejected.
The relevancy of feedback eUects is inducible from the dissimilarity of crisis responses. With
respect to feedbacks from German stimuli, suitable models are 1b and 2 from the export’s angle.
There is no deviation between the responses for 2009—that is to say, there was no feedback from
the German stimulus packages. On the contrary, feedback eUects were inWuential for Germany’s
trade partners. Looking at crisis responses in model 2 and 3 for imports, German imports would
have remained static for one quarter longer without foreign income eUects.
5 summary and further research
Synoptically stated, both, direct and indirect, eUects do matter. At the macro-level, ruling
determinants of eUect proportion are propensities to export and import. Small propensities
to export promote a strong income eUect on exports and high propensities to import foster
income eUects on imports. In accordance, German exports were dominated by direct and imports
by indirect eUects. Even more important is that trade dynamics are best understood from the
perspective of a conglomeration of direct eUects and output or income dynamics. In succession,
this allows to segregate government inWuence on trade, which is not possible in a direct-eUects-
only approach.
There are some chances to extract a double beneVt from a stimulus through a feedback eUect
(there are no hints that Germany can proVt from stimulus echoes). A portion of Vscal spillovers
can return back to the emitter. By the same token, the sensitive reaction of imports to income
changes can be translated into a demand for international coordination of Vscal policy.
What would be interesting is further research in two Velds. Before all else, how did the crisis
act in other countries than Germany? The strategy to answer this question could adopt the modus
operandi of this paper, respectively employ the demonstrated approach in a comparative analysis
involving a number of countries, in this vein, expanding the width of the analysis. Second, Ma
and Cheng (2005) have found evidence for a break in crisis reaction structure initiating in 1990.
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Worth knowing is if the recent crisis was diUerent from previous crises in a basic way. With
other words: from a temporal view, analysis depth should be expanded.
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a information about trade partners , essential data characteristics and
estimation results
Table 6: Selection of trade partners and corresponding trade share
Index Trade partner Export trade share Import trade share
1 Belgium* 0.0522 0.0414
2 Bulgaria 0.0021 0.0021
3 Czech Republic 0.0272 0.0365
4 Denmark* 0.0146 0.0133
5 Estonia 0.0012 0.0005
6 Ireland* 0.0047 0.0200
7 Greece* 0.0067 0.0026
8 Spain* 0.0390 0.0296
9 France* 0.0995 0.0792
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Table 6: Selection of trade partners and corresponding trade share
Index Trade partner Export trade share Import trade share
10 Italy 0.0616 0.0539
11 Cyprus 0.0007 0.0003
12 Latvia 0.0009 0.0007
13 Lithuania* 0.0017 0.0017
14 Luxembourg* 0.0061 0.0037
15 Hungary* 0.0149 0.0211
16 Malta 0.0003 0.0003
17 Netherlands* 0.0668 0.0892
18 Austria* 0.0560 0.0416
19 Poland 0.0383 0.0357
20 Portugal* 0.0076 0.0055
21 Romania 0.0076 0.0079
22 Slovenia* 0.0037 0.0044
23 Slovakia 0.0090 0.0106
24 Finland 0.0082 0.0067
25 United Kingdom* 0.0654 0.0486
26 Iceland* 0.0003 0.0009
27 Norway 0.0073 0.0236
28 Switzerland* 0.0447 0.0409
29 Croatia 0.0022 0.0009
30 USA* 0.0667 0.0552
31 Japan 0.0144 0.0283
∑ 0.7316 0.7069
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany and own calculations (trade shares for the Vrst quarter 2010)
* banking crisis starting 2007/2008 according to Laeven and Valencia (2010)
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
yit 1012.5 3207700 204040 563980
yt 511400 575760 537850 18580
Xit 47.669 24463.0 4844.5 5692.0
Iit 6.1990 17613.0 3810.6 4088.1
∑i Xit 114917.359 192550.7 150179.334 22857.680
∑i Iit 95567.984 146602.9 118129.369 16232.965
log(yit) 6.9202 14.981 10.272 1.9268
log(yt) 13.145 13.263 13.195 0.034233
log(Xit) 3.8643 10.105 7.5298 1.6070
log(Iit) 1.8244 9.7764 7.2547 1.7486
log(Di) 5.6350 9.0967 6.9730 0.74284
log(exit) −0.92483 7.5685 2.4929 2.2114
ct 0.0000 1.0000 0.18605 0.38929
euit 0.0000 1.0000 0.64291 0.47932
ggdi 0.0000 1.0000 0.29107 0.45443
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany. Eurostat and own calculations
Table 8: Correlation matrix
log(Di) log(Iit) log(Xit) log(yt) log(yit) log(exit) ct ggdi euit
1.0000 −0.1442 −0.1564 0.0000 0.2917 0.0346 −0.0000 −0.5815 −0.2817 log(Di)
−0.1442 1.0000 0.9429 0.0870 0.8476 0.1751 0.0328 0.4502 0.2036 log(Iit)
−0.1564 0.9429 1.0000 0.1174 0.8617 0.1819 0.0402 0.4840 0.2787 log(Xit)
0.0000 0.0870 0.1174 1.0000 0.0449 0.0064 0.4441 −0.0024 0.2833 log(yt)
0.2917 0.8476 0.8617 0.0449 1.0000 0.1415 0.0243 0.2035 0.0723 log(yit)
0.0346 0.1751 0.1819 0.0064 0.1415 1.0000 0.0063 −0.0814 0.1264 log(exit)
−0.0000 0.0328 0.0402 0.4441 0.0243 0.0063 1.0000 −0.0008 0.1632 ct
−0.5815 0.4502 0.4840 −0.0024 0.2035 −0.0814 −0.0008 1.0000 0.2156 ggdi
−0.2817 0.2036 0.2787 0.2833 0.0723 0.1264 0.1632 0.2156 1.0000 euit
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 9: Estimated models for the propensity to export and import
German propensities
Variable FE export coeXcients RE export coeXcients FE import coeXcients RE import coeXcients
C −6049.650∗∗∗ −6064.130∗∗∗ −7529.410∗∗∗ −7540.470∗∗∗
(1726.670) (2001.550) (1363.020) (1537.700)
yt 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
t 62.724∗∗∗ 62.536∗∗∗ 27.838∗∗∗ 27.695∗∗∗
(7.452) (62.536) (5.882) (5.883)
∆exit −2.412 −2.426 −5.816 −5.785
(16.058) (16.068) (12.676) (12.679)
euit −645.806∗∗∗ −638.327∗∗∗ −438.233∗∗∗ −432.541∗∗∗
(105.951) (105.931) (83.637) (83.573)
R2 = 0.980 R2 = 0.980
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.546 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.653
Foreign propensities
Variable FE export coeXcients RE export coeXcients FE import coeXcients RE import coeXcients
C 2545.950∗∗∗ 2411.010∗∗∗ 2963.370∗∗∗ 2796.500∗∗∗
(154.020) (598.218) (191.609) (786.257)
yit 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
t 63.451∗∗∗ 62.036∗∗∗ 93.422∗∗∗ 91.627∗∗∗
(3.479) (3.417) (4.328) (4.272)
∆exit −7.227 −7.326 −3.850 −4.073
(13.099) (13.164) (16.296) (16.431)
euit −478.711∗∗∗ −452.193∗∗∗ −659.341∗∗∗ −623.888∗∗∗
(87.377) (87.306) (108.702) (109.024)
R2 = 0.976 R2 = 0.982
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.022 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.002
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Note: There is no causality behind negative EU variable coeXcients but only a reWexion of sample selection.
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 10: Unrestricted estimation results for exports: model 1a–b
Model 1a Model 1b
Variable FE RE POLS FE RE POLS
C −16.941∗∗∗ −12.643∗∗∗ −26.359 −23.304∗∗∗ −15.627∗∗∗ −27.029
(4.404) (4.822) (15.328) (4.681) (4.914) (15.706)
log(yit) 1.331∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.043) (0.008) (0.086) (0.042) (0.008)
log(yt) 0.912∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 2.364∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗
(0.340) (0.359) (1.169) (0.364) (0.367) (1.198)
t 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
euit −0.002 0.044∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.004 0.055∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018) (0.017) (0.030)
log(exit) −0.556∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.029) (0.006)
log(Di) −1.219∗∗∗ −0.823∗∗∗ −1.143∗∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.025) (0.145) (0.025)
ggdi −0.395 0.231∗∗∗ −0.203 0.185∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.038) (0.232) (0.039)
ct −0.047∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.054 −0.049∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.052
(0.021) (0.022) (0.073) (0.022) (0.023) (0.075)
ct−1 −0.019 −0.014 −0.003 −0.019 −0.013 −0.001
(0.021) (0.022) (0.074) (0.022) (0.023) (0.076)
ct−2 −0.030 −0.029 −0.028 −0.028 −0.029 −0.028
(0.020) (0.022) (0.072) (0.022) (0.022) (0.074)
ct−3 −0.041 −0.046 −0.025 −0.039 −0.047 −0.020
(0.028) (0.030) (0.098) (0.030) (0.031) (0.101)
ct−4 −0.105∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.070 −0.085∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.066
(0.032) (0.034) (0.112) (0.034) (0.035) (0.114)
ct−5 −0.055 −0.061∗∗ −0.062 −0.053 −0.062 −0.061
(0.029) (0.031) (0.102) (0.031) (0.032) (0.104)
ct−6 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.022 0.017 0.017
(0.029) (0.031) (0.102) (0.031) (0.032) (0.104)
ct−7 0.034 0.032 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.036
(0.029) (0.031) (0.102) (0.031) (0.032) (0.104)
ct−8 −0.042 −0.047 −0.039 −0.033 −0.047 −0.038
(0.030) (0.032) (0.105) (0.032) (0.033) (0.108)
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) ≈ 0 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) ≈ 0
R2 = 0.995 R2 = 0.937 R2 = 0.994 R2 = 0.934
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 11: Unrestricted estimation results for exports: model 2–4
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable FE RE FE RE FE RE
C −23.023∗∗∗ −14.777∗∗∗ −23.061∗∗∗ −14.950∗∗∗ −23.054∗∗∗ −14.893∗∗∗
(4.630) (4.858) (4.667) (4.880) (4.680) (4.910)
log(y∗it) 1.511
∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.042) (0.087) (0.041) (0.093) (0.042)
log(y∗t ) 1.133∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 1.545^{***}
(0.359) (0.363) (0.361) (0.365) (0.363) (0.367)
t 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
euit 0.003 0.056∗∗∗ 0.008 0.057∗∗∗ 0.004 0.060∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
log(Di) −1.136∗∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗ −1.120∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.141) (0.142)
ggdi −0.192 −0.166 −0.170
(0.227) (0.226) (0.228)
ct −0.003 0.007 0.027 0.026 0.064∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
ct−1 −0.023 −0.019 −0.024 −0.020 −0.024 −0.019
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
ct−2 −0.030 −0.032 −0.033 −0.033 −0.034 −0.034
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
ct−3 −0.065∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
ct−4 −0.124∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ct−5 −0.045 −0.051 −0.052 −0.055 −0.056 −0.058
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ct−6 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.037 0.035
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ct−7 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.043 0.041
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ct−8 0.008 0.010 0.057 0.042 0.122∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) ≈ 0 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) ≈ 0 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) ≈ 0
R2 = 0.994 R2 = 0.994 R2 = 0.994
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 12: Unrestricted estimation results for imports: model 1a–b
Model 1a Model 1b
Variable FE RE POLS FE RE POLS
C −32.447∗∗∗ −27.319∗∗∗ −23.326 −32.972∗∗∗ −26.840∗∗∗ −24.050
(7.611) (7.757) (22.466) (7.556) (7.734) (22.765)
log(yit) 0.436∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.062) (0.011) (0.139) (0.062) (0.011)
log(yt) 2.669∗∗∗ 2.441∗∗∗ 2.154 2.689∗∗∗ 2.413∗∗∗ 2.217
(0.588) (0.581) (1.713) (0.587) (0.580) (1.736)
t 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
euit 0.079∗∗∗ 0.049 −0.027 0.079∗∗∗ 0.047 0.001
(0.029) (0.026) (0.044) (0.029) (0.026) (0.044)
log(exit) −0.046 0.034 0.045∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.042) (0.008)
log(Di) −0.851∗∗∗ −0.988∗∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗ −1.003∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.036) (0.208) (0.036)
ggdi 0.277 0.100 0.248 0.051
(0.335) (0.056) (0.332) (0.056)
ct −0.059 −0.055 −0.056 −0.059 −0.055 −0.055
(0.036) (0.036) (0.107) (0.036) (0.036) (0.109)
ct−1 −0.031 −0.034 −0.038 −0.031 −0.035 −0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.108) (0.036) (0.036) (0.110)
ct−2 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
(0.035) (0.035) (0.106) (0.035) (0.035) (0.107)
ct−3 0.012 0.017 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.013
(0.048) (0.048) (0.144) (0.048) (0.048) (0.146)
ct−4 −0.026 −0.017 −0.026 −0.024 −0.018 −0.023
(0.055) (0.055) (0.164) (0.055) (0.055) (0.166)
ct−5 −0.062 −0.057 −0.057 −0.062 −0.056 −0.056
(0.050) (0.050) (0.149) (0.050) (0.050) (0.151)
ct−6 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.007
(0.050) (0.050) (0.149) (0.050) (0.050) (0.151)
ct−7 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.034
(0.050) (0.050) (0.149) (0.050) (0.050) (0.151)
ct−8 −0.007 0.002 0.000 −0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.052) (0.052) (0.155) (0.052) (0.052) (0.157)
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.885 p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) = 0.869
R2 = 0.988 R2 = 0.888 R2 = 0.988 R2 = 0.885
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 13: Unrestricted estimation results for imports: model 2–4
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable FE RE FE RE FE RE
C −32.159∗∗∗ −26.396∗∗∗ −32.177∗∗∗ −26.445∗∗∗ −32.178∗∗∗ −26.236∗∗∗
(7.474) (7.645) (7.475) (7.646) (7.474) (7.641)
log(y∗it) 0.463
∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.062) (0.139) (0.062) (0.149) (0.063)
log(y∗t ) 2.617∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ 2.594∗∗∗ 2.369∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.573) (0.579) (0.573) (0.580) (0.572)
t 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
euit 0.079∗∗∗ 0.048 0.079∗∗∗ 0.048 0.077∗∗∗ 0.049
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
log(Di) −0.863∗∗∗ −0.861∗∗∗ −0.885∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.211) (0.212)
ggdi 0.248 0.250 0.214
(0.338) (0.338) (0.338)
ct 0.048 0.043 0.058 0.058 0.069∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
ct−1 −0.041 −0.043 −0.041 −0.044 −0.041 −0.043
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
ct−2 0.040 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.039
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
ct−3 −0.050 −0.038 −0.056 −0.049 −0.061 −0.059
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
ct−4 −0.113∗∗ −0.098 −0.120∗∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ct−5 −0.043 −0.040 −0.045 −0.043 −0.046 −0.045
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ct−6 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ct−7 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ct−8 0.090 0.089 0.105∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman)
= 0.893 = 0.883 = 0.963
R2 = 0.988 R2 = 0.988 R2 = 0.988
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 15: Restricted estimations for direct import eUects: sample without Malta
Model 1a Model 1b
Variable FE RE FE RE
C −38.530∗∗∗ −32.882∗∗∗ −28.907∗∗∗ −39.533∗∗∗ −32.934∗∗∗ −28.990∗∗∗
(4.556) (4.834) (4.108) (4.527) (4.818) (4.100)
log(yit) 0.461∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.062) (0.056) (0.115) (0.062) (0.056)
log(yt) 3.133∗∗∗ 2.867∗∗∗ 2.531∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗ 2.870∗∗∗ 2.536∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.351) (0.303) (0.363) (0.350) (0.302)
t 0.000 −0.002 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 0.000
(0.001) 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
euit 0.114∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
log(exit) −0.116 −0.004 −0.010
(0.064) (0.040) (0.039)
log(Di) −0.823∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗ −0.821∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.169) (0.210) (0.170)
ggdi 0.273 0.420∗∗ 0.277 0.423∗∗
(0.328) (0.169) (0.329) (0.169)
ct −0.070∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
ct−2 0.029 0.043 0.032 0.043
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) p(Hausman) p(F-Test) = 0 p(Hausman) p(Hausman)
= 0.040 = 0.048 = 0.126 = 0.196
R2 = 0.987 R2 = 0.987
*** signiVcant at 1% level – ** signiVcant at 5% level – standard errors in parentheses
Note: Technically, RE estimators are not indisputably adequate for model 1a. But, to create a basis of comparison
for crisis responses, RE estimators are employed in case of model 1a too.
Source: Federal Statistical OXce of Germany, Eurostat and own calculations
30
